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GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE
CYNTHIA

R. FARINA*

The final lines of Paradise Lost describe Adam and Eve finding
themselves, for the first time, in the world that lay beyond the bounds of
Paradise:
They looking back, all th' eastern side beheld
Of Paradise, so late their happy seat...
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon;
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide:
They hand in hand with wand'ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.'
After reading Professor Edley's and Professor Sunstein's Articles against
the backdrop of their recent books, 2 I know how Adam and Eve must
have felt. Closed forever behind us is what we legal thinkers are wont to
regard as paradise: the familiar realm of detached objectivity, abstract
reasoning and neutral principles, the comfortable regions of procedure
rather than substance, courts rather than legislators or bureaucrats, and
law rather than politics. Ahead lies a wild unknown world that demands
of us explicit choices among values, an understanding-obtained through
the labor of our hands-of the way things "really" are, and a wrestlingby the sweat of our brow-to make them what we want them to be.
Milton's genius in ParadiseLost was in urging us to reconceptualize
what had traditionally been understood as a tragic fall from grace, and to
view it instead as a challenge needful to, and worthy of, the human spirit.
The genius of the scholars of the "new public law' ' 3 is that they urge
upon us a similar conceptual shift. At a time when much of administrative law, as traditionally understood, threatens to become at best irrelevant and misguided, and perhaps affirmatively harmful, they invite us to
rethink the nature of the enterprise as well as our ability to contribute to
* Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, Cornell Law School.
1. J.MILTON, PARADISE LOST 280-81 (S.
Elledge ed. 1975).
2. C. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY
(1990); C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE (1990).

3. Affirming the existence of the "new public law" is easier than describing its contours. See
Symposium: The New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991) [hereinafter Symposium]. The
creation of a canon of "new public law scholars" is a disputatious enterprise, see Eskridge & Peller,
The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV.
707, 737-38 (1991), but Sunstein and Edley would surely appear on any such list.
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it. They tantalize us with a vision in which law, lawyers, and legal scholars can play a central role in defining and achieving what we as a society
want to be. Like Milton's protagonists, we find the world all before us,
and we are at once exhilarated and afraid.
I wholeheartedly embrace the project that Professor Sunstein calls
the study of administrative substance4 and Professor Edley describes as
"the elaboration and application of principles of sound governance." 5 In
this Comment, I focus on several aspects of how this project is to proceed. Specifically, I consider four general questions that encompass a
miscellany of hopes and concerns about getting from where we are to
where we want to be:
How are we going to do this?
Who is going to be our audience?
What must we be prepared to supply?
Where should we look for guidance and inspiration?
I.

How ARE WE GOING To Do THIs?

By any measure, the task before us is a formidable one. Professor
Sunstein argues that we must "explore the real-world consequences of
regulatory programs, the values and commitments that do or should underlie those programs, and alternative mechanisms to promote the goals
of regulation while minimizing the risk of regulatory failure."' 6 Professor
Edley perceives the following as symptoms of the crisis in governance:
slothful or misguided public institutions; a lack (or even loss) of progress
in education, crime, poverty, and discrimination; a decline in electoral
participation; and a loss of faith in democratic institutions. 7 Both Articles set forth a wide-ranging descriptive and normative agenda that begins with extensive empirical observations, proceeds through analysis
both closely reasoned and broadly informed, and aspires toward values
8
self-consciously selected and justified.
The scope and ambition of the project is breathtaking-so much so
that I worry whether lawyers (or even legal academics) can hope to do
such things. How does our training prepare us to understand, let alone
4. See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 607-11.
5. Edley, The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561,
562; see also C. EDLEY, supra note 2, at 213-64.
6. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 645-46.
7. See Edley, supra note 5, at 564-65.
8. The emphasis on empirical exploration and the explicit focus upon questions of values are
hallmarks of the new public law scholarship. See generally Symposium, supra note 3 (describing
"new public law" scholars' rejection of "positivist" or "objectivist" epistemology, to embrace instead
the view of law as socially constructed).
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unsnarl, these factual and theoretical complexities? The descriptive part
of the undertaking calls for a competence in data collection and interpretation that we associate with the psychologist, the anthropologist, the
sociologist, or the political scientist; the normative part enters into the
province of the philosopher, the economist, and the historian. Yet the
only one of these disciplines in which any appreciable number of legal
academics have any training is economics. I am apprehensive that, in
this circumstance, we will come to believe that economics is the only tool
we need. The temptation is, in part, that it is often the only tool at hand;
but the pull is deeper than mere expediency. Self-confidently bridging
the gap between the "soft" and the "hard" sciences, economics holds out
the promise of imposing upon the unruly mass of human behavior the
rigor of a scientific system. Plotting out the path of rationality, efficiency, and welfare maximization, it finesses the line between description
and prescription. In its neutral, detached, and technocratic certainty, economics lures legal thinkers in a way few other disciplines can.
Yet we have good reason to suspect that economics (at least when
pressed into service as an aid to reform legal and political institutions) is
not neutral. In his sympathy for the goals of much social regulation,
Professor Sunstein is unusual among legal scholars of the economic bent.
The charges that he so painstakingly sets out to answer-that such regulation "amounts to unjustified paternalism or public meddling in private
affairs" 9-are leveled principally by his fellow law-and-economists. The
link between economics and the libertarian vision of the night watchman
state may not be inevitable, but any world-view peopled with Homo
economicus-the egotistic, rational preference-maximizing actor-will
find it hard to admit the possibility of public-regarding political action.
I do not mean to deny the role of economics in the project of creating the new public law. If we are to make real progress in combating
poverty, pollution, crime, housing shortages, and the host of other pressing social problems, we must understand the economic implications of
governmental action. And I surely do not mean to denigrate Professor
Sunstein's work in justifying regulatory programs in market terms. 10
The market is, for better or worse, a powerful component of our current
ideological framework; if mandatory recycling,II or protection of endangered species,1 2 can be defended in terms responsive to this ideology, one
fewer progressive social program will require defense in some other fashion. The problem arises from allowing the ideal of the market and the
9. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 609.
10. See id. at 631-42; C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 48-55.
11. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 620.

12. See id
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rhetoric of efficiency to become our exclusive (or even our principal) way
of defining, or defending, our value choices. I see three principal dangers
here.
First, the power of economic justifications for regulation diminishes
as those explanations proliferate. If "market failure" comes to seem the
rule rather than the exception 13 -because of collective action problems,
prisoners' dilemmas,14 the adaptive quality of preferences, or the underproduction of information or opportunities-adherents of the market
will begin to experience considerable cognitive dissonance. Is there really
a "there" there? The easiest resolution of this crisis of faith will be to
reject, or at least heavily discount, assertions of failure.
Second, many core progressive programs are difficult for even the
most sympathetic and sophisticated theorist to justify in market terms.
Despite Professor Sunstein's assurances, wealth redistributive programs
with Dependent Children (AFDC) 5 are not
such as Aid to Families
"easily defended" 1 6 in a "system that prizes (as all systems should) private property, freedom of contract, and other voluntary arrangements." 1 7 Professor Sunstein is not blind to these problems. His defense
of regulation draws upon democratic aspiration as well as market
remediation.18 But because this alternative mode of justification also
rests upon the ideal of autonomous actors realizing themselves through
unforced choices, 19 there remains a real and unresolved tension. The
new property that is being redistributed through social welfare programs
to some citizens was formerly the private property of other citizens; the
line of consent to this transformation is often so attenuated as to be
mythic.
Finally, even in areas in which market justifications for regulation
seem strongest and most adequate, the economic cast of mind can lead
the most sensitive economic theorist to skew the assessment of the interests at stake. Consider, for example, the proposition that anyone who
13. See Edley, supra note 5, at 599.
14. A "prisoners' dilemma" is a game theory situation in which two prisoners find it rational to
"rat" on each other, although they would both be better off if they could trust each other to remain
silent-that is, "choices that are individually rational become collectively disastrous." D. FARBER &
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 36 (1991).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1988).
16. C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 55.
17. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 622. Such programs have been attacked by several prominent
market-theory libertarians. See, eg., J. BUCHANAN, LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL

ECONOMY INTHE 1980s, at 178-85 (1986); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 306-29 (1985).
18. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 620.
19. See, eg., id. at 620 & n.56; see also id. at 620 (defending regulation as facilitating choice).
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wishes to pollute ought to pay to do so.20 Forcing someone who proposes to inflict harm to internalize the full costs of that harm seems unexceptionable as a general regulatory principle. Nevertheless, even if we
were completely confident of our ability to set the right price for licenses
to pollute, there may be good reasons why we should hesitate to adopt
this as our standard regulatory paradigm. Consider, for example, two
hypothetical statutes:
A: "You are forbidden to poison your neighbor's drinking water. If
you do so, you are subject to criminal prosecution and a fine of
$50,000."
B: "If you want to poison your neighbor's drinking water, you may
buy the right to do so for $50,000."
To the economist, these statutes might be effectively identical (or could
be made so if the fine in Statute A is enhanced to account for the costs of
undergoing prosecution and discounted to reflect the likelihood of being
caught and convicted). But a society that adopts Statute A as the expression of its public policy is likely to be a very different place from the
society that expresses its values in the form of Statute B-just as the
society that justifies its rape laws on the ground that the subordination of
women is unacceptable is very different from the society that punishes
rape to protect the marriage market. 21 Until the day on which most citizens think about their world in economic terms, Statute B may well
stand as the normative statement: "It is acceptable for one person to
harm his neighbor as long as he's willing to pay for it." It may well seem
the ultimate commodification of human life, the public codification of
one morality for the rich and another morality for everyone else.22 A
way of thinking that overlooks the real (even if intangible) "costs" of
such a regulatory strategy dangerously skews our search for values from
the outset.2 3
20. See id. at 634.
21. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1862-63, 1879-81 (1987).
22. See generally S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRON-

MENT (1981) (critiquing the use of economic incentives in environmental policy).
23. Professor Sunstein acknowledges these concerns by suggesting that the pay-for-permission
strategy should not be used when the "right level" of the harmful conduct is zero. See Sunstein,
supra note 4, at 635. This is a helpful start, but I believe his suggestion needs to be carried further,
and in a different direction.
If a permit scheme is inappropriate in such circumstances, the reason is not the instrumental
argument that "[s]uch a strategy would be inconsistent with the underlying goal of eliminating the
conduct altogether." Id. The goal of eliminating conduct requires (as a matter of instrumental
rationality) only that the license fee be set high enough to be prohibitive and that the permit requirement be vigorously enforced. By the same token, the strategy of an outright statutory ban is not
instrumentally irrational whenever the right level is "well above zero," id.; statutes can (and do) ban
greater than a specified level of conduct.
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If we are going to succeed in discovering the societal values through

which all citizens can flourish, and the public institutions through which
power can be directed wisely and responsibly towards those ends, we
reductionist power of the economic
must resist the mesmerizing,
model. In our efforts to understand "the incentive effects of regulatory
initiatives," 24 economics must take its place beside, not ahead of, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and history. In our attempt to use
"government to promote democratic aspirations and economic wel-

fare, '

25 economics

must share the stage with moral philosophy, political

theory, ethics, and literature.
This brings me back to my apprehension about whether we who are

trained in law can do what is necessary to create the new administrative
law. If we are going to draw, as we now must, on the full range of
human knowledge about ourselves and our world, we will have to develop very different habits of mind. We think we have escaped the

Langdellian elitism of law as an autonomous discipline. However, our
engagements with other disciplines remain, at the core, imperialistic. We

invade other fields of knowledge, expropriating bits of wisdom we fancy;
If the "right level of conduct" is relevant in deciding whether to use a pay-for-permission strategy, the reason is that our judgment about how much of the harm is tolerable might reflect our
judgment about the nature and significance of the values at stake. For example, we may judge the
right level of assault to be zero because we are (or want to be) a society that holds life and physical
integrity very dear. If so, then a regulatory strategy that controls the incidence of assault through a
license requirement would be inappropriate even if the result were a lower assault rate (because the
fee were astronomical and the enforcement draconian) than that obtainable through a conventionally
enforced criminal law. The problem is not instrumental irrationality; the problem is the disjunction
between the initial social value judgment ("injuring another person is wrong") and the ultimate
codification as public policy ("failing to pay before you injure another person is wrong").
But even this explanation does not fully get at the problem because it falsely implies that meaning is independent of expression. The way in which a society formally articulates its values determines (at least in part) the content of those values. To prohibitfailingto pay before assaulting is to
redefine the wrong-and thus to reformulate what it is that we value. Consider Professor Sunstein's
response to my hypothetical statutes. He apparently would consider Statute B, allowing "those who
assault or poison others.., to do so merely by paying a fee," id. at 635, as inappropriate. Yet why
does that statute seem so obviously unacceptable when he apparently would approve another statute
that allows a glass manufacturer to discharge lead and chromium into the water supply as long as it
first buys a license? Perhaps because the presence of the heavily value-laden word "poison" enables
us to recognize immediately the normative redefinition that occurs in Statute B-a recognition that
comes harder in the case of the less highly charged label "discharge of pollutants."
The normative question entailed in pay-for-permission strategies is: Should we allow this sort of
redefinition to occur? I do not suggest that overt commodification is inevitably an inappropriate
regulatory strategy. (I say "overt" to acknowledge that, for those who have internalized the economic way of thinking, even the form of an outright statutory ban may be understood as commodifying the conduct, if the sanction-read as "price"--for noncompliance is a monetary fine.) Rather,
my concern is that, because the economic way of thinking is insensitive to the "costs" of commodification, we may not even ask the question.
24. Id. at 645.
25. Id.
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we hire their sages to be our expert witnesses or our adjunct lecturers.
We are careful to retain control; when we do implicate law with other
disciplines, we emphasize the law, and deemphasize, for example, economics or sociology. Thus, the result is LAW and economics, or LAW
and sociology. We have not yet managed, for the most part, to achieve
truly collaborative intellectual relationships with other disciplines. 26 If
we are going to succeed in this new public law enterprise, we must somehow learn to share the power of problem solving-in our classrooms, in
our research, in our scholarship, in our litigating, and in our judging.
II.

WHO

Is GOING

TO BE OUR AUDIENCE?

This brings me to the question of whom we understand our audience
to be. Professor Sunstein's insistence (with which, I gather, Professor
Edley generally agrees) that we must direct our work to lawmakers and
bureaucrats is an admonition we cannot hear too often. 27 Nonetheless, I
would like to advocate attention to two other equally crucial groups.
The first group that both principal Articles explicitly consider is
judges. Professor Sunstein bluntly argues for devaluing the place of the
judiciary in the discourse of the new public law. 2 Before I disagree too
strenuously with him on this point, I want to acknowledge that his position may be largely tactical. Professor Sunstein has himself devoted
much time and energy to considering how judges should approach administrative action; his thoughtful work on statutory interpretation, for
example, presupposes an involved, even activist, judiciary. 29 His dismissal of the judicial audience may be a strategic effort to counterbalance
our traditional obsession with courts. So, as I make my case that new
public law scholars should unapologetically talk to judges, I recognize
that Professor Sunstein may be with me in his heart-of-hearts.
Why is it appropriate (indeed essential) that we see the judiciary as
part of our audience? The first reason is purely defensive: Whatever we
26. There are notable and encouraging exceptions. See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN & E. MACCOBY,
DIVIDING THE CHILD: THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (forthcoming 1991) (collaborative empirical study of divorce and child custody by legal scholar and developmental
psychologist).
27. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 645; Edley, supra note 5, at 562. I would add that, if we wish
to be listened to, we must attempt to break the professional habit of dispensing solutions from on
high. To be sure, organizations such as the Administrative Conference of the United States and the
Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association have enabled administrative law scholars to do better than many of our law school colleagues in maintaining relationships with public
officials and practitioners. Still, the academic culture in which most of us work does not encourage
us to go out into the field and develop prescriptions in collaboration with those who would actually
apply them.
28. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 642.
29. See id. at 642-44; C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 111-92.
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succeed in accomplishing with legislators and agency officials can be undone by judges. I am not here suggesting a deliberate campaign of judicial sabotage rooted in hostility to the regulatory enterprise or in antimajoritarianism. Rather, I am acknowledging a powerful institution
whose understanding of its mission must evolve in relation to changing
understandings of the goals and methods of the regulatory enterprise.
For a long time, we have placed upon our courts the heavy burden of
rendering safe (and hence legitimate) the power of administrative agencies. If administrative law has been largely "the antidiscretion project,"' 30 judges have been the designated project engineers. As a culture
with a strong disposition to bring difficult social problems into our courts
for discussion and resolution, we have been especially demanding with
respect to the ideological and practical dilemmas posed by the regulatory
state. Judicial review has been the principal avenue through which we
have sought conformity with the legislative mandate, rationality in process and outcome, and at least some degree of individual fairness and
systemic equity. Given this history, we cannot reasonably expect judges
suddenly to intuit that the rules of the game have fundamentally
changed. Habits that are so thoroughly ingrained will die hard, unless
the new administrative law sees as an important part of its mission the
31
goal of redirecting the power of courts.
Consider, for example, rulemaking. Administrative law professors
can readily produce a string of judicial decisions over the last thirty years
that have shaped whether and how agencies employ rulemaking as a
means of promulgating regulatory policy. Although we may vigorously
debate the wisdom of the particular twists and turns accomplished by
FloridaEast Coast Railway,32 Vermont Yankee, 33 or State Farm,34 we
cannot deny their impact on agency behavior. Indeed, the effect of the
(judge-made) "law" of rulemaking on the behavior of regulating and
regulated entities was one of the principal justifications for the recent
amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 5 The Negoti30. Edley, supra note 5, at 566; see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 607-08.
31. Of course, we could crudely solve the problem by abolishing or radically restricting judicial
review. However, this would be so counter to our settled cultural expectations about the availability
of courts as a forum for questioning official action that the remedy would likely prove more traumatic than the disease. See infra note 39.
32. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (restricting required use of
formal rulemaking).
33. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (forbidding courts from imposing extra-statutory procedural requirements on informal rulemaking).
34. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (requiring considerable and nonpolitical justification for agency change in policy).
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372 (1988).
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ated Rulemaking Act of 199036 inaugurates a new policymaking paradigm: "reg neg,"' 37 an experiment embarked upon to produce rules that
are sounder as a matter of regulatory policy, less expensive to implement
and enforce, and more acceptable to both regulated and beneficiary
38
populations.
39
What are judges to do with the products of this grand experiment?
They are accustomed to agencies playing the role of impartial adjudicator, executive expert, or partisan policymaker. 40 Now, an agency will
stand before them in the bald-faced role of deal broker. The judiciary
has, since 1937, accepted the growth of the regulatory state on the

strength of the legislature's insistence that private ordering cannot be
trusted to produce the public interest in a complex society. 41 Now,

courts will be asked to see the public interest in governmental facilitation
of private consensus. Therefore, is it any wonder that even judges who
are the most open-minded, sympathetic to the regulatory enterprise, and
concerned about the real-world effects of legal decisions have voiced
grave reservations about the grand experiment?42 Negotiated rulemaking

is at least a plausible response to Professor Sunstein's call for institutional
arrangements that allow flexible, privately orchestrated solutions and

provide incentives for industry to seek, rather than to combat, the issu36. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590); see
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK 2 (1990) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].

37. Negotiated rulemaking, or "reg neg," allows private interests to participate directly in the
conception of agency regulations. Interested parties negotiate and agree on a proposed rule, which is
then submitted to the agency concerned. This recommendation forms the basis of the regulation in
its final form. See generally Perritt, NegotiatedRulemaking Before FederalAgencies: Evaluation of
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEo. L.J. 1625 (1986).
38. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act § 2 ("Findings") (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 581);
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 3-5, 23, 27-29.
39. Despite the advice of some experts, e.g., Harter, NegotiatingRegulations: A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 102-07 (1982), Congress refused to preclude, or even limit, judicial review of
negotiated rules. Indeed, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act goes so far as to specify that such rules
"shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the product of other
rulemaking procedures." Negotiated Rulemaking Act § 3 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 590). This
strong legislative affirmation of judicial involvement, coming even as Congress endorsed a major
regulatory innovation, underscores how difficult it would be to disengage the courts from the new
administrative law.
40. The three paradigms are, of course, taken from Professor Edley. See Edley, supra note 5, at
568-69; C. EDLEY, supra note 2, at 13-29.
41. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (affirming the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby marking the end of judicial resistance to the course
of socio-economic regulation).
42. See, eg., Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985) (expressing concern about end-product of reg neg, especially if judicial review is diluted).
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ance of regulations. 43 Surely, however, whatever promise reg neg holds
will be cutailed, or at least badly distorted, unless we help judges develop

a conceptual framework and a real-world understanding within which
the rules that emerge from this new process can be productively
evaluated. 44
Let me give another example. Professor Edley urges 45 -and I take

it Professor Sunstein would agree-that agencies (like the rest of us in
the new administrative law) should be explicit about the value choices
that they make, rather than masking their ideological stance beneath the

legalism of statutory interpretation or the mystique of expertise. By flagging their political choices, agencies would achieve the salutary goal of

"signalling to the public and Congress that the decision, for which the
administration expects to be accountable, reflects the workings of the
electoral process."' 46 There is, of course, good reason why agencies do

not do this at present: The strategies of interpretation and expertise often
work in court; political candor (at least until Chief Justice Rehnquist
collects an additional vote) does not.47
If we want agencies to talk openly about political ideology, then

judges need to know what to do with politics served up as regulatory
justification. Indeed, this issue requires our attention whether or not the
language of agency explanation shifts to the explicitly ideological. If
courts are to move past the position of deference by default (a position

that only appears apolitical 48 ), then judges must have some direction for
negotiating a world in which the Republican Chief Executive systematically attempts to pull agencies in different directions than does the Dem-

ocratic Congress. If courts are to proceed from a more satisfying
account of presidential power than Chevron's facile equation of presidential control with democratic legitimacy,4 9 then judges require some

framework through which to understand what it means for a president to
43. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 631-34.
44. This work has begun, see articles collected in SOURCEBOOK,supra note 36, at 431-912, but
must continue in earnest as reg neg moves out of the realm of experimentation by a few, select
agencies and into more general administrative currency.
45. See Edley, supra note 5, at 577.
46. Id.
47. Although the Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), relied in part on the Chief Executive's political accountability to justify deference to administrative views on statutory meaning, see id. at 865-66, then-Justice Rehnquist could
persuade only three other justices that a change in Administration was a sufficient rational basis for
an agency's change in regulatory policy. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57-59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. My agreement with Professor Edley on this point, see Edley, supra note 5, at 570, is explained further in Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.452 (1989).
49. See Farina, supra note 48, at 502-26; discussion supra note 47.
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be reelected because popular approval of his foreign policy overshadows
popular disapproval of his position on mandatory family leave, civil
rights, or the environment. In sum, judges need the ideological identification of the "principles of sound governance" or "better substantive regulation," as well as the empirical identification of the structures and
strategies for attaining those ends.
This last point may reveal my own conviction that the reasons why
we should continue to speak to judges extend beyond merely the defensive concern with protecting the fledgling programs and processes of the
new administrative law. The courts may be able to contribute affirmatively to the articulation and accomplishment of "better" regulation and,
more broadly, "better" governance. I understand Professor Sunstein to
be making this claim (although in a circumspect fashion) when he argues
for using "the process of [statutory] interpretation as a corrective, albeit
a partial one, against the occasional pathologies of regulatory legislation."50o We need not repeat the mistake of thinking that courts are the
only institution worthy of our attention in order to explore the possibility
that the judiciary can make unique contributions to the enterprise of the
new public law. If lawyers are the professionalsbest suited to achieve the
melding of theory and practice that Professor Edley calls "the duality of
'groundedness while removed,' ,,51 might not the judiciary be the public
institution most susceptible of achieving that perspective?
The second group to whom we must quite deliberately speak occupies a central role in both Edley's and Sunstein's Articles, although not
as a potential audience: the public. Both authors envision that strong
democracy will be an important part of the new administrative law. For
Professor Edley, reversing the disaffection with the electoral process is
both sign and substance of curing the crisis in governance. 52 For Professor Sunstein, the democratic process is a (if not the) principal source of
the values regulation should pursue.5 3 I become very nervous when we
begin to build ideological systems around the electoral process (particularly when its outcomes are to be accorded a privileged status as "our"
value choices and policy preferences) without carefully inquiring into the
factors that shape our public political discourse-and without confronting the extent of our responsibility, as lawyers and legal scholars, for
the quality of that discourse. It is too short a step from Professor Sun50. C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10.
51. Edley, supra note 5, at 584.
52. Id. at 564-65.
53. See, e-g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 633 ("An advantage of a shift in emphasis from means
to ends would be that citizens and representatives would decide the central questions of how much
pollution reduction there should be, and at what cost .. "); cf id. at 640 (advocating desirability of
employees making choices about workplace risk levels over a "national dictation" of those levels).
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stein's liberal-republican aspiration that "citizens and representatives

would decide the central questions of how much pollution reduction
there should be ' 5 4 to Frank Easterbrook's complacent assertion that the

content of actual legislation is the best evidence of what citizens value.5,5
If the new public law is to avoid the facile equation of "what we
have" with "what (apparently) we want," it must begin by acknowledging the constitutive nature of social context and political discourse.5 6

However, it is not enough for us to point out the adaptive quality of
preferences,5 7 the dependence of market (or political) outcomes upon the
availability of opportunities and information,5 8 and the possibility of pub-

lic ideals that differ from private desires59 if we then leave to someone else
the job of undoing maladaptive preferences, increasing information and

opportunities, and nurturing civic altruism. If we are serious about
strong democracy-if we really believe in the practical possibility and

ideological significance of collective self-determination-then we must
commit to bringing our message not just to legislators, agency officials,
and federal judges, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to the people
who are "The People."
I realize that neither Professor Edley nor Professor Sunstein would
quarrel with the desirability of public education on regulatory matters. 6"
My concern is that speaking to citizens should be placed explicitly and

prominently on our list of the ways in which we attempt to reorient the
practice of administrative law. 6 1 Of all the tasks that appear on that list,
54. Id. at 633.
55. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 85, 118 (reasoning, in
arguing against present procedural due process doctrine, that "if people potentially eligible under the
substantive terms of a statute value hearings at more than the cost of providing them, they will
clamor for hearings even at the cost of lower money benefits. The contents of the legislation are the
best available evidence about the value the affected people place on hearings.").
56. That is, it must thoroughly repudiate the premise that preferences are exogenous, pre-political, or fixed. Once this premise is repudiated, the whole notion of "paternalism" becomes far more
complicated, both descriptively and normatively..
57. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 621.
58. See id at 622.
59. See id. at 620.
60. Professor Edley laments the lack of informed public discourse on issues of social policy.
See Edley, supra note 5, at 562-63. Professor Sunstein lists, among the causes of regulatory failure,
measures that fail to educate and benefit from involvement on the part of the citizenry. Sunstein,
supra note 4, at 631.
61. My use of "practice" draws less on the conventional legal sense of the word than on Caroline Whitbeck's usage:
By "practice" I mean a coherent form of cooperative activity, or "joint action," ... that
not only aims at certain ends but creates certain ways of living and develops certain characteristics (virtues) in those who participate and try to achieve the standards of excellence
peculiar to that practice.
Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 64, 65 (C. Gould ed. 1984) (citation omitted).
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this may be the one most alien to us. A cynic would say that we lawyers
(and law teachers) have made a business out of mystifying the law and its
processes. To share knowledge is to share power. Even the most generous assessment of our professional culture would have to admit that we
have not seen as part of "our job" the responsibility to make law and
government comprehensible to citizens. Yet unless it becomes our job to
translate the complexity of regulatory policy into terms that can enter
into and engage public political discourse, then "democratic processes,"
"participation," and "civic deliberation" will remain mere rhetoricempty slogans pressed into service to sell a brand new ideology that is
really just the same old thing.
III.

WHAT MUST WE BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY?

The question of whom we ought to address leads me to the question
of what we ought to supply. This is the aspect of the project on which
the two Articles make the most extensive and richest contribution. In
particular, they share the insistence that the new administrative law must
be empirical as well as theoretical. 62 I strongly concur that our agenda
must be practical as well as conceptual, and that our work must take
place in the dimension of facts and real-world consequences as well as in
the dimension of theory and normative justification. There is, however,
yet another dimension in which we must work, a dimension that is selfconsciously temporal. Beyond identifying the values we think government should further and describing the structures most likely to achieve
those values, we must also provide interim strategies for getting from
where we are now to where we want to be. We must, in other words,
confront and resolve what Christine Littleton has called, in another context, "the problem of transition": "What strategies might move us in the
direction of the tentative ideal while minimizing the dangers of partial
reform?" 63 Let me provide a specific example.
In discussing the pressing environmental problem of automobile pollution, Professor Sunstein notes the relative ineffectiveness (even countereffectiveness) of our present regulatory tactics. 64 He suggests that an alternative approach-increased gasoline taxes that more fully reflect the
environmental and other costs of automobile usage-would be "an especially promising strategy. ' 65 As with other proposals that seek to minimize the incidence of harmful but commonly engaged-in activities by
62. See Edley, supra note 5, at 583; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 608-09.
63. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 23, 31.
64. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 637.
65. Id.
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forcing the actors to internalize costs, this regulatory strategy would disproportionately burden the poor. Immediately sensitive to this objection,
Professor Sunstein provides a number of reasons why the regressivity of a
higher gasoline tax should not dissuade us from it: (1) If full cost internalization places an important commodity beyond the reach of many citizens, the sensible solution is to subsidize directly its purchase by those
citizens; (2) command-and-control strategies are also regressive, but in a
more arbitrary and less visible way; and (3) the refusal to allocate costs
fully is not a sensible redistributive strategy because the class of beneficiaries will not be coextensive with the people who have a legitimate
claim to government support. 66 We could concede that on the theoretical level these are completely persuasive responses, but still insist that on
the practical level they are completely beside the point. On the day after
the price of gasoline is doubled or tripled to force us to apprehend more
accurately the costs of driving, we lawyers, judges, agency heads, and
legislators may grumble a bit as we sign higher credit card bills; but,
unless a lot of other things have changed as well, the effects on a substantial portion of our population will be immediate and devastating. 67
Unless we are confident that changes in regulatory tactics will "naturally" be accompanied by measures to dampen the harshest effects of
change (and everything we know about the episodic, uncoordinated, sideeffect-insensitive nature of the political process suggests the opposite),
then we cannot afford to ignore the problem of transition. We lose the
very normative ground we seek to gain if the costs of regulatory reform
fall disproportionately on the already disadvantaged, because we have
not taken care to ensure the coordinated adoption of ameliorative measures. If such ideological considerations are not enough, there is also the
pragmatic danger of neglecting interlocutory strategies. Unless we make
clear the linkages between the superior regulatory approaches we seek
and the inferior approaches we have-unless, for example, a new gasoline
tax were not only accompanied by legislation undoing other perverse in66. Id. at 638-39.
67. In 1988, 27.3% of all U.S. households had an income of less than $15,000. Not surprisingly, minorities are disproportionately represented in this group, which includes 46.9% of AfricanAmerican households and 37.2% of Hispanic households. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 444, table 716 (110th ed. 1990).
My assumption that full internalization of social costs would double or triple gasoline prices is
not unadulterated speculation. One New England environmental group has estimated that, if the
price of gasoline in Massachusetts were adjusted to incorporate the costs of automobile insurance
(thereby forcing drivers to confront, at the pump, the costs of personal injury and property damage
resulting from automobile use) this adjustment alone would add $1 per gallon to the retail price.
Remarks of Douglas I. Gay, Executive Director of the Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Harvard Law School, Feb. 25, 1991.
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centives in the area 68 and cushioning the shock of change-over, but also
preceded by a determined campaign of popular education-the new approach may not survive the political process. And even if it does become
law, piecemeal or uncoordinated implementation may discredit the entire
regulatory tactic in the eyes of politicians and the public.
In the end, my emphasis on transition strategies is simply an extension of Professor Sunstein's observation that regulation often fails because it "address[es] only part of [a] complex problem[]," 69 leads to
"unanticipated systemic consequences," 70 or ignores the fact of "complex tradeoffs among competing social goals."'7 1 We need to remember
that regulatory reform can fail for precisely these same reasons. Which
leads me to my final question:
IV.

WHERE SHOULD WE LOOK FOR GUIDANCE AND INSPIRATION?

Both Articles agree that the new administrative law must be
founded, deliberately and unapologetically, upon some ideological base
rich enough both to prescribe the goals for and to assess the performance
of public institutions. 72 I wholeheartedly share this belief.
The two Articles disagree about what this generative ideology ought
to be. Professor Sunstein is fairly conservative, advocating a familiar,
fundamentally liberal base.7 3 To be sure, it is liberalism shorn of its harsher, Hobbesian/libertarian elements and softened by traces of civic republican virtue. Still, it is classically liberal to the core, with its
exaltation of individual autonomy and rational self-determination, 74 its
abiding faith in the market, 75 and its insistence on the importance of private property. 76 Professor Edley is more radical, looking beyond liberalism, possibly to Critical Legal Studies, but more likely to a civic
republicanism more newly post-modem than familiarly liberal. 77 On this
point, I am going to part company with both authors.
68. An example of such a perverse incentive is the imposition of pollution-control requirements
only on new cars. See R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING
THE AUToMOBILE 89-90 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 637.
69. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 631.
70. Id. at 627.
71. Id.
72. See Edley, supra note 5, at 562-63; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 608-09.
73. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 611-22.
74. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
75. Professor Sunstein's perceptive accounts of market failure take place against the background proposition that "private markets usually promote individual freedom and economic welfare." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 618-19.
76. See id. at 612 n.20.
77. See Edley, supra note 5, at 589-90.
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With respect to Professor Sunstein, my disagreement over choice of
generative ideology occurs at the most fundamental level. He is trying to
breathe some human spirit (with ideals and aspirations) into Homo
economicus. As I said earlier, this is important work, for the ideological
power of economic theory is so great. Someone thoroughly familiar with
its rules has to challenge the law-and-economics libertarians at their own
game. In the end, however, it is not enough. We need to change the
game. Homo economicus can be made better, but he cannot be made the
protagonist of the new ideology. He is not rich or complex enough; he
has not the heart for it. This is where Professor Edley comes in, with his
search for new, post-liberal starting points and new, post-pluralist ways
to proceed. And so I do not want to disagree with Professor Edley as
much as I want to push him to even greater radicalism: toward feminist
theory.
Professor Edley acknowledges feminism as an important manifestation, along with Critical Legal Studies and civic republicanism, of third
wave post-liberal theories."7 8 He chooses, however, to focus on civic republicanism because feminist legal theory, although more extensive than
the republicanism literature, has not had much to say about public law. 79
Initially, I would like to convince Professor Edley that any "edge" civic
republicanism possesses is, at best, a temporary one. Then, I want to
sketch out, very preliminarily, why feminism may be an especially promising source for the sort of "political ideology, legal theory, and practical
invention" 80 that would recreate administrative law.
Civic republicanism may be losing its ideological steam. One of its
two most influential proponents in the legal academy, Frank Michelman,
is moving away from (or, perhaps, beyond) it.81 The other, Professor
Sunstein, is obviously committed to keeping it an active part of the discourse, but his republicanism is too caught up in an effort to regenerate
liberalism to provide the sort of compelling post-pluralist political ideology that Professor Edley seeks. To be sure, other voices have contributed to the republican revival, but unless one of them emerges as a strong
and more radical standard-bearer, we will not see the continuing conceptual and practical elaboration that must occur if civic republicanism is
going to serve as a source of programmatic inspiration.
By contrast, feminist legal theory is increasingly vigorous. Rapidly
expanding in quantity, it is also ever more venturesome in scope. Professor Edley is right that feminist legal theorists have not thus far concen78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
See id. at 589 n.83.
Id. at 564.
See Michelman, Postmodern Constitutionalism (unpublished manuscript).
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trated on governance and the shape of public institutions. 82 But it is only
a matter of time. Martha Minow's work on the family,8 3 Liz Schneider's
work on battered women, 84 and Judy Resnik's work on process 85 (to take
just a sampling) stand on the threshold-if not actually inside the doorway-of public law. Catharine MacKinnon and others are building links
among feminist legal theorists, feminist political scientists, and philosophers to develop a theory of the state. 86 Feminism must confront the

administrative state. It is a practical necessity, for the condition of women in our society is intimately tied to the operation of many social welfare programs. 87 It is also an ideological necessity, for feminists have a
88
strong and long-standing quarrel with the public/private distinction. If
Professor Edley is correct that transformative legal theory is produced by
"some felt need to remake government," 8 9 then, I suggest, it is the passionate conviction of feminism, rather than the scholarly cerebration of

civic republicanism, that is likely to birth true innovation. 90
What might feminist theory offer the project of the new administra-

tive law? Let me sketch out a few possibilities. 91 For one thing, because
82. See Edley, supra note 5, at 589 n.83.
83. See, eg., Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 933 (1985); Minow, Legislative Approaches to Work and the Family, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGiS. 295 (1989); Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986).
84. See, eg., Schneider, Describingand Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986); Schneider, EqualRights
to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980).
85. See, eg., Resnik, Due Process: A PublicDimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 405 (1987); Resnik,
Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. L. FORUM 43; Resnik, On the Bias: FeministReconsiderationsof the
Aspirationsfor Our Judges, 61 S.CAL. L. REy. 1877 (1988).
86. See, eg., C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987) [hereinafter C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-

NIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
87. As the gap between rich and poor Americans grows greater, and as our population grows
relatively older, women with children and women past retirement age increasingly constitute the
class of citizens that depends upon the exercise of regulatory power. See Becker, Politics,Differences
and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169; Nelson, Women's Poverty and Women's Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality, 10 SIGNS 209, 221-23 (1984).
88. See, e.g., Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV.617, 631 (1990) (boundary
between state and family is problematic on descriptive, prescriptive, and normative grounds; conventional public/private dichotomies provide no useful conceptual scheme for assessing constraints on
state power).
89. Edley, supra note 5, at 581.
90. Hence I would nurture the misgivings that Professor Edley already has about whether civic
republicanism can deliver the necessary "sharp, distinctive critique within the realm of political
ideology." Id. at 592.
91. The ideas suggested in this very abbreviated sketch are developed further in Farina, ConceivingDue Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991). That article is itself only the beginning of
my own exploration of the implications of feminist understandings and methodologies for administrative law.
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feminist theory tends to be less concerned about trenching on "liberal
sensibilities" than is civic republicanism, it is less inclined to resort to
what Professor Edley calls "the procedural dodge" 92 -that is, emphasizing deliberative, process goals rather than attempting to specify the content of "the public good."' 93 I do not mean to suggest that feminist
theory has a detailed agenda of what constitutes the public good. It is,
however, more ready to engage openly in the debate over the substantive
ends to which power should be directed. Or, to put it somewhat differently, feminist theorists, because of how they typically conceptualize personhood and society, are under no delusions that this debate can be
avoided:
Because individual identity forms within personal relationships and social networks, society must be understood as both constituted from,
and constitutive of, the persons within it. Its dominant forms of activity will both reflect and create their values, needs and desires. Just as a
person continually shapes and is shaped by her local environment, so a
people continually makes and is made by its government and its law.
Given this, it would be meaningless to charge the state to avoid
privileging certain conceptions of the good over others. All exercises
of government power are value-laden. The greater the reliance upon
government and law as forms of activity through which a society defines the physical, economic and social conditions in which citizens
live, the greater is the need to acknowledge this fact. In any but the
most minimalist state, the pursuit of neutrality is not only illusory but
dangerous, disguising the fact that certain conceptions
of the good and
94
certain distributions of power are being favored.
The recognition that every exercise of public power reshapes, for good or
ill, the public and private world compels a continual striving to identify
95
the set of values that government ought to pursue.
One consequence of the abbreviated treatment in this Comment is that I cannot adequately

convey the complexity of contemporary feminist theory. There is no one feminism and no definitive
canon of feminist principles. However, I believe that the basic ideas and methods described in this
section would be acknowledged by many (perhaps most) feminist legal theorists. Still, there is dan-

ger that my attempt to signal diversity of viewpoint by using the convention "typically feminist" may
in fact aggravate the problem of reductionism.
92. Edley, supra note 5, at 593.
93. An early and important strand of feminist legal theory did draw on the liberal tradition.
See Ginsburg & Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 9; Williams, Notesfrom a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99. See generally A.
JAGGER, FEMINIST POLrrIcs AND HUMAN NATURE 27-50 (1983) (describing liberal feminism).
Contemporary feminist legal theory, however, tends to be suspicious of (if not openly hostile to)
conventional liberal assumptions. See generally West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988) (describing differences between strands of feminist theory and both liberalism and
Critical Legal Studies).
94. Farina, supra note 91, at 260-61. Of course, the maintenance of a minimalist state would
itself be a heavily value-laden distribution of power.
95. I have suggested elsewhere that feminist understandings of human nature, society, and
power generate two fundamental value commitments: (1) Working toward an equitable distribution
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In this striving, feminist legal theorists are committed, on ideological
grounds, to the interdependence of theory and practice that Professor

Edley finds so essential. This commitment is rooted in a particular epistemology. Feminist theory typically understands knowledge as contextual-that is, as embedded in situation and experience, rather than
derived from principle through abstract logic. Therefore, the meaning
and value of rules and institutions can be discovered only, by understand-

ing how they affect the people within them. 96 Feminism typically understands knowledge as nonfinal-that is, as expanded by increasing
perspective and seeking out voices on the margins. Therefore, ends and

97
means must constantly be reassessed as new information is acquired.

In sum, feminist methodology is already deeply committed to Professor

Edley's proposition that "[tihe theorist should test the practical inventions against experience, such that there is a continual process of ideolog-

ical development, theoretical enterprise, and institutional or doctrinal
reform (or revolution)." 9 8
Moreover, this understanding of how knowledge is attained makes
possible the kind of interactive, collaborative decisional structures that
of resources and opportunities, so as to minimize the circumstances in which persons become victims
and perpetrators of oppression; and (2) cultivating practices that affirm the connection with others,
so that power will be exercised under the ethic of care and responsibility. See id. at 259-61. Compare these normative propositions with the substantive portion of Professor Edley's "tentative suggestions" for a post-pluralist political ideology. See Edley, supra note 5, at 594-95.
96. This emphasis upon "constructedness" and "situatedness" may suggest the complex and
controversial question (far beyond the scope of this Comment to consider) of the relationship between feminism and postmodernism. Whatever that relationship, feminist theory surely could not be
faulted for "rel[ying] too heavily on abstract claims of contingency and constructedness, and focus[ing] too little on developing specific substantive remedies for injustice and inefficiencies in existing systems." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 618 n.47.
97. This reassessment is one element of what Katharine Bartlett describes as feminist practical
reasoning. See Bartlett, FeministLegal Methods; 103 HARV. L. REV.829, 850-51 & n.80 (1990).
The emphasis upon contingency, fluidity, and transformation may be understood not as prizing
these qualities for their own sake, see Sunstein, supra note 4, at 618 n.47, but rather as valuing their
power to counteract entrenched ways of thinking that have led to pain and oppression. As Professor
Bartlett explains:
Some "truths" will emerge from the ongoing process of critical reexamination in a form
that seems increasingly fixed or final.... These truths, indeed, seem to confirm the view
that truth does exist (it must; these things are true) if only I could find it.... The problem
is the human inclination to make this list of "truths" too long, to be too uncritical of its
contents, and to defend it too harshly and dogmatically.
Bartlett, supra, at 883-84.
98. Edley, supra note 5, at 583. Thus, I have suggested elsewhere that the process of developing and realizing our value commitments "will necessarily be an incremental and iterative one, in
which answers are developed in context and theories are modified with experience to yield results
that approximate ever more closely what we hope to become as a people." Farina, supra note 91, at
261-62; see also id. at 266, 268-70 (due process adjudication is a necessary means to reassess and
reassert value commitments). Compare this with the procedural portion of Professor Edley's "tentative suggestions" for a post-pluralist political ideology. See Edley, supra note 5, at 594-95.
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Professor Edley envisions when he speaks of courts actively pursuing better public administration by inviting a dialogue with agencies and Congress over the norms of sound governance. 99 An anti-imperialistic
conception of knowledge-a conception in which "truth" is continually
being created from the bottom up rather than imposed once and for all
from the top down-is the first essential component in weaning adjudication from its tendency to produce "ham-handed impositions binding in
all circumstances for all time."' 10 The next step is the recognition, previously noted, 10 1 of the constitutive nature of personal and social relationships. If we believe that our individual and collective identity is shaped
by our dominant cultural practices, then we would acknowledge that, for
a people who regularly bring into courts our most compelling social issues-from police brutality to disparate educational opportunities, from
the provision of mental and physical health care to the use of nuclear
power-adjudication can represent a critical moment in which we examine the society we are and elaborate the one we aspire to be. We
would thus be led to re-create adjudication as a self-consciously valuegenerating activity in which the participants come together to discover
what is right, rather than a battle in which winners and losers are declared, and the spoils of war are distributed.
Finally, there is the most important contribution that feminist theory can make to the project of recreating administrative law: It can help
us think about power. That administrative law has, until now, been
trapped in "the antidiscretion project" is not mere happenstance. We
have a deeply ideologically embedded fear of power. As Professor Edley
says, "the premise ... [is] that discretion in the state is dangerous."' 10 2
Hobbes gave us the war of all against all; 10 3 law and economics gave us
Homo economicus, the self-centered, self-satisfying rational actor. Even
the kinder, gentler strains of liberalism (like Professor Sunstein's) share
this fear; they set out to ensure that more citizens have access to the
rights, private property, and market opportunities that are thought to
protect individual autonomy from the encroaching or engulfing pressure
of private or governmental others. Critical Legal Studies did not ameliorate this fear; indeed, it made it worse by revealing the seamy underside
of hierarchy and the multitude of subtle ways in which disparities in
power consolidate oppression. Civic republicanism did try to paint a different picture--of people of good will coming together to deliberate
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Edley, supra note 5, at 601.
Id.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Edley, supra note 5, at 566.

103. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64 (1914).
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responsibly and open-mindedly upon the public good-and was
1 4
promptly accused of the worst sort of naive romanticism.
We have a deeply ideologically embedded fear of power. Yet, there
can be no administrative state without vast disparities in the power of
government officials and citizens. There can be no regulatory agenda
without vast quantities of administrative discretion. The new administrative law must be about living with power. And this is where feminist
theory can make a distinctive (perhaps even unique) contribution.
Feminism speaks about power stereophonically. One channel,
sometimes called radical or dominance feminism,10 5 tells of the terrible
dangers of power-the exploitation, the domination, the invasion-in
terms even more graphic than those used by Critical Legal Studies. The
other channel, sometimes called cultural feminism,10 6 tells of the nurturing, compassionate, responsible use of power. Rooted in the experience
of women in our culture, feminist theory has two voices: The voice of the
victim who knows the reality of power abused to ravage, to maim, to
diminish, and the voice of the caretaker, who knows the reality of power
extended to help, to heal, to enable.
I do not claim that feminism has succeeded in integrating these two
voices into a single, richly textured harmony any more than women in
our society have resolved the duality of being victim and caretaker.
There is still much dissonance within feminist theory, reflecting great
ambivalence about the extent to which and the means whereby power
can be rendered safe. Still, because each of these experiences of power is
simultaneously part of the women's experience from which feminism
draws its motivating force and direction, feminist theory will have to
continue to seek that integration. And it is precisely this sort of integrated understanding of power-an understanding capable both of eschewing the pie-in-the-sky utopianism that merely results in new (or,
more likely, the same old) victims, and of sustaining the search for practices that foster the responsible use of discretion-that administrative law
must achieve if it is to transcend the antidiscretion project.
104. See, eg., Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609
(1988) (arguing that a revival of republicanism would fail to consider all viewpoints, most notably
those of blacks); Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some CautionaryNotes on Civic Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1651 (1987) (expressing grave doubts about the practical success of civic republicanism);
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1987) (arguing that a republican revival
would institute a disadvantageously reconceived political process).
105. Its most prominent advocate among feminist legal theorists is Catharine MacKinnon. See
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 86.
106. The works of Carol Gilligan and Robin West illustrate this aspect of feminist theory. See
C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59.
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To be sure, it will not be a simple, obvious task to realize-in the
structures, programs, and doctrine of the new public law-the implications of feminist understandings and methodologies. But truly transformative institutional and doctrinal inventions never appear simple or
obvious at their inception. The question is where we are most likely to
find the will and the capacity to work a transformation. Professor
Edley's own formulation 10 7 points directly toward feminist theory as a
singularly appropriate answer: Coming to us as part of a powerful critique of something important in the world, this is an ideology whose radical potential is unlimited.

107. See Edley, supra note 5, at 594 ("[Republicanism's] radical potential is limited because it
has not come to us as part of a powerful critique of anything important in the world.").
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